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Here's a Tip, Change the Law!
Nerva v. United Kingdom
I. INTRODUCTION
Former restaurant employees Sandro Nerva, Jose Pulleiro,
Jose Gigirey-Cabo, and Julio Rodriguez ("the Waiters") initiated
Nerva v. United Kingdom in 1994 against Paradiso e Inferno and
Trota Blu ("the Restaurants").' The Waiters claimed that during
the six years prior to March 6, 1989, they were not paid the
minimum wage that was mandated under UK law. The Waiters'
breach of contract claims invoked violations of the Wages Council
Act of 1979, as well as the Wages Act of 1986.2
The Restaurants argued that they were entitled to use credit
card and check generated tips to pay down the state mandated
minimum wage because the customers wrote out the credit card
and check transactions payable to the Restaurants, and not the
Waiters.4 Thus, the Restaurants maintained that those tips
belonged to them.5 On May 25, 1994, the High Court of England
agreed with the Restaurants, holding that tips included in check
and credit card transactions did P6roperly count against the
minimum remuneration requirement. The court also rejected the
Waiters' contention that the Restaurants were holding the tips in
trust for them. Essentially, the court found that legal title to such
1. See Catherine Elsworth, Waiters Lose Fight Over Credit Card Tips, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 25, 2002, available at http://www.dailytelegraph.co.uk (last visited Feb.
10, 2004); see also Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 5-8.
2. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 11-12.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Id.
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tips paid by credit card or check became the Restaurants'
property, not the Waiters'.8
The Waiters took their case to the Court of Appeal.9
Significantly, in their appeal, the Waiters accepted the proposition
that legal title to non-cash tips first passed to the employer.'0 They
"no longer relied on the argument that they were to be considered
beneficiaries of money held on trust for them by the employer."'1
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the High Court and
the Waiters appealed to the House of Lords.12 The House of Lords
granted leave for an oral hearing; the Waiters' claims, however,
were ultimately rejected."
The Waiters subsequently took their case to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) arguing, inter alia, that Article 1
of Protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") was
violated because they experienced interference with their right to
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. 4 The ECHR
disagreed, holding that credit card 5 tips belonged to the
Restaurants, not the Waiters. 6
This Note argues that the ECHR was incorrect in its decision
to grant the Restaurants the unfettered right to take non-cash tips
left by customers, and consequently, to use those monies to pay
down the statutorily mandated UK minimum wage. Part II
outlines the relevant facts in Nerva. Part III introduces the non-
legal rationales driving the practice of tip giving in restaurants.
Part IV uses public policy, "commonsense" rationale, UK case
8. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7. The premise that the
Waiters possessed an indivisible proprietary interest in cash tips was uncontested in the
litigation. Id.
9. Id. at 7; see also Nerva v. RL&G Ltd., 1996 INDUS. REL. L. REP. 461 (UK).
10. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8.
11. Id. at 8-9. As will be discussed in detail, this concession may have proved fatal to
the Waiters' case. Once the Waiters accepted that legal title had in fact transferred to the
Restaurants, the court went further in the analysis to substantiate why, in light of the
applicable minimum wage legislation, the Restaurants could use the "Restaurant owned"
tips to pay down the minimum wage as "remuneration."
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. The hearing was before a three-judge panel, yet, after five minutes of oral
argument, the appeal was dismissed. Id.
14. Id. at 11.
15. The term "credit card" will be utilized to imply both credit card and check
transactions.
16. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
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law, and ECHR case law to argue that (1) waiters have a
legitimate expectation to receive title in credit card tips and (2)
customers intend to give tips to waiters, not restaurants. Thus, the
decision in Nerva deprives the Waiters' right to peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions. Allowing restaurant owners to
hold legal title in tips is, therefore, a violation of Article 1 of the
Convention. Part V applies U.S. statutory law to the facts in Nerva,
primarily to recommend ways in which legislative reform can
enhance the financial security of service employees within the
United Kingdom. Part VI concludes that the House of Commons
should adopt a pending amendment that would reverse the Nerva
line of cases-at last placiiig the disputed tips in the hands of their
rightful owners.
II. FACTS
When the Waiters in Nerva started working for the
Restaurants, it was customary for tips received in cash to be placed
in a box called a "tronc."" At the end of the week, a "troncmaster"
distributed the tips proportionally to the Waiters."' Similarly, every
time tips were received through credit cards, an equivalent cash
amount was removed from the cash register and placed into the
tronc.19
In 1979, the Restaurants were forced by tax authorities to
abide by the "Pay-As-You-Earn" system.20 Under this system, the
Restaurants became responsible to ensure that tips left via credit
cards were subject to income and national insurance tax, and that
the Restaurants' own national insurance contribution reflected
those totaled sums. 21 Rather than putting the cash equivalent of
the non-cash tips in the tronc as before, the Restaurants decided to
operate on a different system.22
The Restaurants' new system included an "additional pay"
section on the Waiters' weekly pay slips. 23 This additional pay
section was supposed to reflect the credit card tips earned by the
17. Id. at 6.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6.
23. Id.
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Waiters.24  The Waiters initially opposed this system, but
predictably25 they acquiesced to the Restaurants' new management
scheme.26
Yet, this new system contained a hidden change not
previously discussed with the Waiters. Although the Restaurants
purportedly paid the non-cash tips to the Waiters in full, they were
using these sums as payment against their minimum wage
obligations under the UK Wages Councils Acts.28
III. BACKGROUND
Before delving into the ECHR's legal rationale, it is
important to evaluate the practice of tipping from a non-legal
perspective. Without understanding the socio-cultural context
within which customers traditionally give tips, certain inherent
flaws of the ECHR's holding cannot be fully understood.
Consider a common hypothetical regarding the average
restaurant customer. After a customer finishes her meal, she
prepares to pay the bill with her credit card. While awaiting the
receipt, the customer may evaluate how pleased she was with her
waiter in order to gauge the amount of tip deserved. Alternatively,
she may have turned into a human calculator, figuring out a
predetermined percentage that she gives to all waiters. In that
entire process, the customer never reflects on the precise
question-"To whom am I giving this gratuity?"
Typically, when customers give a tip in addition to what they
pay for food or drink, they intend the gratuity to be given directly
to the person who served them.29 The most common rationale for
tipping is to thank the waiter, acknowledge the service, and
provide a little extra compensation.0
24. Id.
25. The word "predictably" is used because service employees commonly possess
little bargaining power relative to their employers. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE
LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 986 (5th ed. 2003).
26. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. "[M]ost customers believe that when they leave a credit card tip it goes to the
waiter." Cyril Dixon, Here's a Tip, Give in Cash, THE DAILY EXPRESS, Sept. 25, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 101128187 (quoting Solicitor Catherine Scrivens who represented the
Waiters in Nerva).
30. Thompsons Solicitors, Subsidising Low Pay, 73 LAB. & EUR. L. REV. 2 (2002)
available at http://www.thompsons.law.co.uk/.
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Another reason for giving tips is to comply with the cultural
norms of a given country, city, or state.31 In New York and Los
Angeles, for example, as in much of the United States, it is
customary to give no less than a 15-20 percent gratuity.32 In
Europe, however, there is less of a tipping culture33 and the
practice is optional on much of the continent.34 Yet, one of the
better established tipping cultures within Europe is in London,
England,35 where it is customary to give anywhere between a 10-15• • 36
percent gratuity in restaurants.
IV. THE ECHR's PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS
Public policy and "commonsense" rationale suggest that (1)
waiters have a legitimate expectation to receive title to credit card
tips and (2) customers intend to give tips to waiters, not
restaurants. A look at ECHR and UK case law also supports this
proposition.
A. Legitimate Expectation and Customer Intent
The UK Government ("the Government") represented the
defendant Restaurants because the ECHR proceeding implicated
the validity of a UK domestic court judgment.37 The Government
argued that the Restaurants ultimately paid the tips to the Waiters
38
while still complying with minimum wage requirements. Thus, theWaiters ultimately obtained title in those sums.39 Moreover, the
31. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 58 (Harvard U. Press 2000). Some
scholars argue that the principal reason behind tipping is not to provide incentives or to
reward for good service, but to assuage fears of social disapproval. See Leo P. Crespi, The
Implications of Tipping in America, 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 424, 429 (1947), Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1129-30 (2000), Ofer H.
Azar, The Implications of Tipping for Economics and Management, 30 INT'L J. SOC.
ECON. 1084, 1088 (2003)("[T]he reason[] for tipping is that tipping is a social norm and
that disobeying the norm is associated with a disutility caused by feelings of unfairness and
embarrassment.").
32. See LYNN ARANY ET AL., FODOR'S NEW YORK CITY 2005, at 232 (2004); see also
ERIKA LENKERT ET AL., FROMMER'S CALIFORNIA 2004, at 62 (2004).
33. See Virtual London, Tipping, at http://www.a-london-guide.co.uk (last visited Oct.
3, 2004) [hereinafter Virtual London].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6,13.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id.
20051
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Government argued, it was clear from the terms of the
employment contract that the Waiters had a legitimate expectation
that the tips would pass to them, but only after the tips had
become the property of the employer. 4°
The ECHR stressed that the Waiters could not use the
legitimate expectation principle to argue that the customers
intended to transfer property in the tips directly to them without
the tips first becoming their employer's property.41 Furthermore,
the ECHR stated that the Waiters could not have legitimately
expected that the credit card tips would not be treated as
remuneration because domestic law had always provided that, with
the exception of an employee's business exgVenses, all payments by
an employer would count as remuneration.
In The Former King of Greece v. Greece, the ECHR held that
the Former King of Greece had a legitimate expectation that he
would be compensated for land that the new Greek dictator took
from him.43 He had a legitimate expectation because decades
earlier, compensation was provided when the property was
expropriated."
By analogy, in Nerva, the previous Restaurant policy was to
give all credit card tips in cash to the Waiters at the end of the
week.45 Accordingly, this prior practice would reasonably give rise
to a legitimate expectation among the Waiters that they would
receive their tips in addition to their contractual wage. It is indeed
ironic that UK restaurants are permitted to shirk their minimum
wage obligations after the enactment of domestic minimum wage
legislation. The ECHR's interpretation of UK minimum wage laws
implicates the ineffectiveness of the laws that were enacted to
ensure that waiters earn no less than a minimum wage.
The notion of customer intent is also lost in the ECHR's
reasoning. As stated by the court in Nerva:
[T]he [Waiters] cannot claim that they had a legitimate
expectation that the tips at issue would not count towards
remuneration. Such a view assumes that the customer intended
that this would not be the case. However, this is too imprecise a
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id.
43. The Former King of Greece v. Greece, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 121,149.
44. Id.
45. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6.
[Vol. 27:127
Nerva v. United Kingdom
basis on which to found a legitimate expectation which could
give rise to "possessions" within the meaning of Article 1 .... 46
Firstly, it is doubtful that customers give credit card tips with
the intention that legal title to the gratuities pass first through the
Restaurants before reaching the Waiters' pocketbooks. Secondly,
it is highly improbable that customers ever leave tips with the
intention of helping restaurants fulfill their minimum wage
obligations under the law. The problem lies in the fact that
customers never give any thought to such a question. Customers
assume as axiomatic that tips will pass directly into the hands of
the waiters who dutifully served them. As previously mentioned,
the function of a tip is either to reward good service, or
alternatively, to comply with cultural norms, or both.47
If posed with the question, however, a majority of patrons
would account for the relatively large amount of money that they
pay to the restaurant for the meal, and consequently declare a
preference that title to the tips never pass to the restaurant. Public
consensus and preference, therefore, would militate toward the
Waiters' direct receipt of tips in addition to the minimum wage.
The ECHR, however, was unwilling to undertake an analysis of
customer intent. It stated, in a most conclusory fashion, that the
notion of customer intent is too "imprecise" a standard for
determining whether the Waiters legitimately expected to receive
their tips as "possessions." In effect, this unwillingness created an
insurmountable standard of proof for the Waiters attempting to
show that their tips qualified as their own "possessions."
An implied minor premise of the ECHR's resultant reasoning
is that customers would overtly pronounce an intention to give
credit card tips to waiters if they actually possessed such an
intention.48 In other words, if a customer states precise words to
the effect of "I hereby intend to bequeath to you, my waiter, the
whole sum of this credit card gratuity," then the waiter would own
the tips apart from remuneration under the UK Wages Act. The
reasoning follows that, because customers never voiced such a
precise intention, one cannot be implied.
46. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
47. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 58; see Virtual London, supra note 33; see also
Mark Wilkinson & Chris Millar, British Waiters Get European Court Ruling on Tipping By
Credit Card, EVENING STANDARD, Sept. 24, 2002, available at http://www.hotel-
online.com/News/PR2002_3rd/Sept02.BritTips.html.
48. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8.
2005]
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As previously mentioned, the answer to this customer intent
conundrum is rooted deeply in notions of commonsense and
universal practice rather than established European jurisprudence.
One would think that these justices have never been patrons, or at
least tipping patrons, at a restaurant. If they had, a moment of self-
reflection before signing the credit card receipt for the meal would
have undoubtedly answered the "legal" question of whether tips
qualify as possessions under Article 1 of the Convention."
B. United Kingdom Domestic Law and Customer Intent
In its analysis, the ECHR shows great deference to UK
domestic courts by pronouncing that those courts are the
appropriate interpreters of UK minimum wage legislation.0 This
statement, of course, contains a glaring exception. When a
domestic court's interpretation of its own legislation conflicts with
one's right to peaceful possession of property,5' the ECHR may
remedy the errant domestic court ruling.' In Nerva, the ECHR
missed a golden opportunity to use UK domestic precedent to
hold that the Waiters were deprived of their possessions in
accordance with Article 1.
1. Wrottesley v. Regent Street Florida Restauran?
3
Both the UK domestic courts and ECHR majority ignored a
prominent King's Bench ruling that could have resolved this case
49. Id.
50. Id. ("[I]t would observe in this connection that that the interpretation and
application of domestic legislation in a given dispute is a matter for the domestic courts.").
51. Id. at 11(Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention states: "Every natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provision shall not,
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the uses of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.").
52. Id. at 13. The ECHR may not, however, impair the UK's right to control the use
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties. The ECHR did not use any of these exceptions to show
why the UK could take property away from its residents because such cases usually
concern the taking of real property for governmental use. See The Former King of Greece
v. Greece, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 121.
53. Wrottesley v. Regent St. Fla. Rest., 2 K.B. 277 (1951).
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in the first instance. 4 While notions of commonsense and public
policy may be unsatisfactory bases to resolve the issue of customer
intent in Nerva, Wrottesley puts legal teeth into the argument that
customers intend to vest tips directly into the hands of Waiters.
In Wrottesley, the Regent Street Florida Restaurant
("Regent") orally agreed with the waiters to put all their tips into a
locked box to be distributed solely to the waiters at the end of the
applicable pay period." As in Nerva, the waiters in Wrottesley
received a pay greater than that mandated by the Wages
Regulation Act at the time.16 The problem, however, was that
Regent attempted to use the tips left for the waiters to offset the
minimum wage it was obligated to pay by law. 7
The magistrate in the lower court felt that the minimum wage
legislation at issue would have explicitly stated any intention for
tips not to be calculated as remuneration. 8 The magistrate then
held that as long as the waiter's pay exceeded the mandated
minimum wage, the sources of the funds did not matter. 9 This
decision led the way for Regent and other restaurants to keep for
themselves the amount in excess of the minimum wage earned by
the waiters in tips.
The Wrottesley court reversed, holding that the purpose of the
Act was to establish a minimum wage for those in the catering
industry, and tips are separate from "wages. ' 6° Thus, it was plain
that the word "remuneration" used in the Act equated to the word
"wages. ' '61 In spite of this holding, both the UK domestic courts
and the ECHR in Nerva held that "remuneration" did not mean
64 62"wages" as written in the Wages Act. This reasoning is difficult to
54. Id. at 278. Although the ECHR is not always bound by UK domestic law, it could
have used Wrottesley as persuasive reasoning considering the fact that there was no ECHR
case on point as to tipping. Moreover, since the ECHR considers domestic law to be of
paramount importance to the decision of cases before it, it stands to reason that Wrottesley
should have been used as an indicator of how English courts have looked at the notion of
customer intent in the restaurant context. Concededly, the case was decided in 1951 when
credit cards were not in use. There is no legitimate basis, however, for distinguishing
between a patron's "customer intent" in the 1950s versus her intent today.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 279.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Wrottesley, 2 K.B. at 279.
60. Id. at 280.
61. Id.
62. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8.
2005]
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reconcile because the structure of the 1943 Catering Wages Act is
wholly analogous to that of the 1979 and 1986 Wages Acts at issue
in Nerva.63
Next, the Wrottesley court held that the employer was plainly
the de facto custodian of the tronc monies and that the monies
never became the employer's property.64 The prosecution in
Wrottelsley enumerated this point by stating:
Certainly, a customer who tips a waiter intends that the
property in the tip shall vest in the waiter: he does not intend to
give anything to the employer, and there is no other
circumstance in the present case to indicate that the property in
the tips passed from the waiters to their employer.65
The next logical question is whether any "other
circumstances" in Nerva indicate that the property passed directly
to the employer.
The ECHR attempted to distinguish the reasoning in
Wrottesley by stating that, since the Restaurant bore the burden of
potential credit card fraud, they should have the right to consider
such tips as their own.66 Moreover, the ECHR highlighted the fact
that the Waiters were not required to indemnify the Restaurants
for failed credit card transactions. The ECHR accepted the
validity of these distinctions without showing any pressing national
need to protect restaurants from any type of epidemic financial
loss caused by fraudulent credit card sales.
To balance the interests of the Waiters and Restaurants, the
ECHR should have at least required evidence of such supposed
burdens upon the Restaurants. Moreover, it is highly probable that
the Waiters would have agreed to wait until the credit companies
63. The Acts are analogous because neither speaks to customer intent regarding
restaurant tips to service employees. In other words, neither Act seeks to confine the
parameters of the word "remuneration." Wrottesley discarded the argument that there is a
presumption in favor of tips counting as remuneration when the applicable wage
legislation is silent on the issue. See Wrottesley, 2 K.B. at 282. The holding in Nerva
effectively created a legal fiction that presumed remuneration to include credit card tips.
64. Wrottesley, 2 K.B. at 283.
65. Id. at 280 (emphasis added). Assuming arguendo that tips became the property of
the Restaurants, the Waiters may have incurred a "necessary expenditure," and thus,
under the Act, such monies still could not be used as remuneration. Indeed, the Wage Act
at issue here contains the same "necessary expenditure" language. This is yet another
example of the parallels between the legislation at issue in Wrottesley versus the Nerva
Wages Act. See National Minimum Wage Act, 1998, c. 39 (Eng.).
66. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
f. I'd.
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made payment before receiving the cash equivalent of credit card
tips left for them.68 For the Waiters, this alternative would have
been preferable to the unadulterated taking of all credit card tips
that should be considered the Waiters' possessions. Thus, this
"potential for credit card fraud" rationale is an insufficient basis
for distinguishing Wrottesley from Nerva.
2. Saavedra v. Aceground69
In Saavedra, a restaurant owner kept for himself a portion of
tips left by customers.70 He considered the portion a self-entitled
"service charge."7 The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that,
although the owner had discretion to allocate tronc monies to
workers as he saw fit, he did not have the legal right to allocate any
of that money to himself." He therefore violated the Wages Act of
1986.73
Similarly, in Nerva, the Restaurants used the Waiters' tips to
help pay down the required minimum wage.7 4 The holding in
Saavedra did not discriminate between credit card and cash tips75
and as a result, its per se holding encompassed both types of tips.76
Indeed, where a statute such as the Wages Act of 1986 does
not mention "credit card tips," it is reasonable to infer that such
tips were not meant to be included as "remuneration." Although
the absence of an applicable credit card provision may imply a
legislative intent to exclude such tips as remuneration, such
absence may never imply an intent to include credit card tips as
remuneration. The Saavedra decision epitomizes judicial restraint
by demonstrating a refusal to create statutory law where none
exists. After all, it was for the Wages Council or Parliament to
decide to include credit card tips as remuneration, not the
68. See Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 (Loucaides, J.,
dissenting)(" [T]here is no reason why the employer could not request its employees to
forego their right to any tips included in the sums of which it was defrauded and did not
receive as a consequence.").
69. Saavedra v. Aceground Ltd T/A Terazza Est, 1995 INDUS. REL. L. REP. 198.
70. Id. at 198.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 198-99.
74. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7.
75. See Saavedra, 1995 INDUs. REL. L. REP. at 199.
76. See generally id.
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Saavedra Court, not the Court of Appeal, and now, not the
ECHR.
C. Avoiding the ECHR's Takings Jurisprudence Under Article 1
The ECHR crafted its holding in Nerva to elude the
heightened scrutiny of its own takings jurisprudence.
By the time Nerva went before the ECHR, the attorneys for
the Waiters had changed strategies.77 They decided to abandon the
position that the credit card tips passed directly to the Waiters.78
Rather, they assumed arguendo that legal title to the tips first
passed to the Restaurant which was then duty bound to distribute
the entirety of the funds to the Waiters as beneficiaries.7 9
The court used this concession to further the proposition that
the credit card tips became the Restaurants' possessions because
the customer-signed vouchers were made out to the Restaurant,
and were cleared through its accounts.8°
By interpreting the tips as Restaurant-owned possessions, the
ECHR was able to circumvent the increased scrutiny of its own
takings jurisprudence. After all, if the tips never belonged to the
Waiters, there could never have been a taking.' If the court had
assumed that a taking had occurred, based on its own precedent,
the taking of the tips would necessarily be deemed a violation of
Article 1. ECHR precedent requires that a state deprivation of
possessions must be in accord with some societal "general
interest. 8 2 It would be difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the
tips were allocated in furtherance of some societal general interest.
Certainly, allowing restaurants to escape minimum wage
obligations does not qualify.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE OF UK WAGE LEGISLATION
If desired, Parliament may amend its domestic minimum
wage laws to abrogate the holding in Nerva. To that end,
77. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13. For further discussion, see supra note 11.
81. Id.
82. See James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 33 (1986); see also
The Former King of Greece v. Greece, 2000-XII, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 145-46; Cyprus v.
Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 47; Jokela v. Finland, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 13.
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Parliament may look to well-crafted, comprehensive tipping
statutes already operating in other common law jurisdictions.
Within the United States, California has enacted a tipping
statute that, if applied to the United Kingdom, would address the
concerns created by Nerva-like reasoning.
Section 351 of the California Labor Code states:
No employer or agent shall collect, take, or receive any gratuity
or a part thereof that is paid, given to, or left for an employee
by a patron, or deduct any amount from wages due an
employee on account of a gratuity, or require an employee to
credit the amount, or any part thereof, of a gratuity against and
as a part of the wages due the employee from the employer.
Every gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the
employee or employees to whom it was paid, given, or left for.
An employer that permits patrons to pay gratuities by credit
card shall pay the employees the full amount of the gratuity that
the patron indicated on the credit card slip, without any
deductions for any credit card payment processing fees or costs
that may be charged to the employer by the credit card
83
company.
This statute is in stark contrast to the UK Wages Act of 1986
used to bolster the ECHR's reasoning. California has gone so far
as to codify the proposition that any tip given by a restaurant
patron is the sole property of the employee who waited the table.
84
This acknowledges the reality of the situation and speaks to the
commonsense concept that customers intend to pass legal title of
tips directly to waiters.85 In effect, it abrogates any potential
arguments that, because the credit card voucher is written out to
83. CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 2003). It is plausible to argue that the wording of
this statute would eviscerate the tronc system used by the Restaurants because that system
requires pooling of tips. Whether or not tips are pooled, however, the significance of such
a statute is that it precludes employers from using any employee-earned tips to fulfill
minimum wage obligations.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. "The purpose of section 351, as spelled out in the language of the statute, is to
prevent an employer from collecting, taking, or receiving gratuity income or any part
thereof, as his own part of his daily gross receipts, from deducting from an employee's
wages any amount on account of such gratuity, and from requiring an employer to credit
the amount of the gratuity or any part thereof against or as a part of his wages. And the
legislative intent reflected in the history of the statute was to ensure that employees, not
employers, receive the full benefit of gratuities that patrons intend for the sole benefit of
those employees who serve them." Searle v. Wyndham Int'l, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1327,
1332 (2002) (quoting Leighton v. Old Heidelberg, Ltd., 219 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1068
(1990)); Indus.Welfare Comm'n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 730 (1980).
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the restaurant, title to such tips pass directly to the restaurant
owner. The statute also preempts the argument that, since the
restaurant bears the burden of failed transations, the restaurant
owner is entitled to the credit card tips as a "possession."
California Labor Code section 1199 states that:
Every employer or other person acting either individually or as
an officer, agent, or employee of another person is guilty of a
misdemeanor and is punishable by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars ($100) or by imprisonment for not less than 30
days, or by both, who does any of the following: ... (b) Pays or
causes to be paid to any employee a wae less than the
minimum fixed by an order of the commission.
If Parliament enacted a parallel statutory framework, the UK
courts would be compelled to hold the Restaurants criminally
liable for avoiding payment of the minimum wage. Moreover, the
move from civil fines to criminal punishments has undoubtedly
increased the level of deterrence and as such, restaurants are less
likely to willfully circumvent national wage laws.
As extreme as such laws may seem relative to the Nerva
decision, they exist for good reason. These laws acknowledge the
fact that historically, service employees worked sixty to eighty
hours per week, often needing to endure long shifts just to earn a
livable wage. 87 Even today, tips are a vital source of a waiter's
income.88
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that over 1.8 million
people work in the UK service iindustry.89 Sixty-seven percent of
these workers are women, and forty percent of them are under
twenty-five years old.9 Thus, the decision in Nerva may have a
disparate impact on both younger people and women who make
up the bulk of the UK service industry.
86. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1199 (b) (West 2003).
87. Dixon, supra note 29, available at 2002 WL 101128187.
88. Id.
89. 409 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2003) 174.
90. Id. at 175.
91. Cf Michael Shannon, Minimum Wages and the Gender Wage Gap, 28 APPLIED
ECON. 1567-76 (1996); see generally Alison Wellington, Effects of the Minimum Wage on
the Employment Status of Youths: An Update, 26 J. HUM.RESOURCES 27-46 (1991).
[Vol. 27:127
Nerva v. United Kingdom
VI. CONCLUSION
Public policy and legal precedent supports one of two
conclusions as it pertains to Nerva: either (1) the Waiters were
paid their credit card tips in full and the UK minimum wage was
not paid, or (2) the minimum wage was paid and the credit card
tips were not paid in full. The former clearly violates UK minimum
wage law while the latter constitutes violations of Article 1 of the
Convention. The Nerva line of cases escape both conclusions, thus
perpetuating a cycle of inequity upon UK service workers.
A. Tipping the Scales Toward an Equitable Balance
"Tips are a reward for good service, not an excuse for
employers to renege on their responsibility to pay wages. [Nerva]
makes a mockery of the minimum wage, which by its very nature is
supposed to be a minimum. '
In response to this very valid line of criticism, Parliament is
ostensibly moving in the right direction. Mr. Michael Connarty, a
Labour Party member, has proposed an ambitious bill that would
alter the latest version of the Wages Act.93
The bill was introduced with the aim of correcting a "legal
anomaly" concerning tips distributed through payroll.94 According
to Connarty, "[t]he [b]ill would deliver the guaranteed national
minimum wage for the 1.8 million people who are probably the
most vulnerable workers in this nation ... . It would ensure that,
when tips are paid and by whatever method, they are for the staff
as a little extra for themselves and not their employer." 95
To recap, under the current National Minimum Wage
96
Regulations, tips paid directly by customers do not count as
wages for the purpose of the national minimum wage. 97 However,
after Nerva, if the tips go through the employer's payroll (such as
service charges or credit card tips), those tips do count towards
92. Dixon, supra note 29, available at 2002 WL 101128187.
93. See 409 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2003) 174; see also UK NAT'L MINIMUM
WAGE REGULATIONS (2003) SI 1999/584, reg 31.
94. See 409 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2003) 174-76.
95. Id. at 175. This amendment would sound the death-knell for Nerva. As of this
writing, Parliament has not promulgated any of these proposed changes to the UK Wages
Act.
96. Cash tips exemplify tips paid "directly" by customers, yet, under current UK law,
credit card tips are not. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-V.III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11.
97. UK NAT'L MINIMUM WAGE REGULATIONS (2003) SI 1999/584, reg 31.
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calculating whether the employee has been paid the minimum
98wage. If enacted, the bill would amend Regulation 31 such that
tips, regardless of the manner of payment, could not be counted as
national wage remuneration.9 9
Insofar as financial security for UK service employees is
concerned, this is indeed a monumental step in the right direction.
Legislators are now beginning to realize the flaws of the
aforementioned domestic and ECHR rulings. They are looking at
their own ineffectual wage regulations with an understanding of its
adverse consequences in light of Nerva. In fact, millions of people
may not be earning the wage they are entitled to. Unfortunately,
the proposed law will do little to help Sandro Nerva, Jose Pulleiro,
Jose Gigirey-Cabo and Julio Rodriguez since their claims are now
moot. For future service employees, however, this law will provide
a significant supplement to their salaries.t°°
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that promulgation of this
proposed law may have the incidental benefit of increasing theS101 n h rseto
level of service in UK restaurants. Imagine the prospect of
attentive waiters who, due to being paid a fair wage, rapidly bring
forth a steaming plate of fish and chips before it becomes too cold
to eat. Until that day arrives, however, the most prudent course of
action, while dining in the United Kingdom, is to pay all tips in
cash.
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98. Nerva v. United Kingdom, 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14.
99. National Minimum Wage (Tips) Act 2003, H.C. BILL 150, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2OO203/cmbills/150/2003150.pdf (last visited
Oct. 16, 2004).
100. Indeed, Professor Saul Levmore argues that the tipping norm is a socially
valuable supplement to the employment contract between service providers and their
employers. Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1991-92 (2000).
101. It is not implied that the service in UK restaurants is relatively poor. It is only
implied that extra incentives may increase the level of service when the amount of tips
received by waiters more closely correlates to their performance.
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